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Justice Blackmun and Preclusion in the
State-Federal Context*
Karen Nelson Moore**
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun’s contributions to the development of the
law in numerous areas demonstrate a commitment to individual
rights, an appreciation for the real effects of a decision on the lives
of the litigants, and a sense of history. These characteristics are reflected in a series of opinions written by Justice Blackmun a decade
ago in the field of preclusion or res judicata, addressing whether
state court adjudication should have preclusive effects on subsequent federal court litigation. Although several of these opinions
were written by Justice Blackmun as dissents or concurrences, together these opinions also show his devotion to the development of
law in a principled way in a significant area of state-federal
relationships.
Under accepted doctrines of preclusion, when issues or claims
have been litigated in one case, the parties are precluded from relitigating them in a subsequent case.1 Merger and bar, also known as
claim preclusion or res judicata, prevent a party from bringing a
subsequent suit based upon a claim which has been decided by a
final judgment in an earlier case involving the same parties.2 Issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating
an issue which has already been decided by a court in a case involv* Originally published in 97 Dick. L. Rev. 465 (1993).
** Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. A.B., 1970;
J.D., 1973, Harvard University. Professor Moore was a law clerk for Justice Blackmun during the 1974 Term.
I wish to thank my research assistant Karen Evans for her able assistance.
1. See generally Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351, 352-53
(1876) (describing claim and issue preclusion). Issue preclusion requires that the
precise issue has been litigated and determined in the prior case, whereas claim
preclusion applies to prevent subsequent litigation “not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Id.
at 352.
2. Id.
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ing the party to be bound by the judgment.3 These doctrines of
preclusion have evolved over the years largely in the context of
multiple cases within the same jurisdiction.4
Much more complicated preclusion problems arise when subsequent litigation occurs in a jurisdiction different from the initial
forum. When the initial forum is a state court, and preclusion is
sought in a subsequent federal court, issues of federalism, the appropriate roles of the federal and state courts, and specific aspects
of particular federal statutes must be confronted. In this area, Justice Blackmun has demonstrated his commitment to individual
rights, his appreciation for the real effects of a decision on the lives
of the litigants, and his sense of history.5
II.

ALLEN V. MCCURRY

An overview of Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence on preclusion in the state-federal context should begin with his dissenting
opinion in Allen v. McCurry.6 In this case McCurry was convicted in
state court of possession of heroin and assault with intent to kill. At
a pretrial suppression hearing the trial judge refused to suppress
evidence seized in plain view during a warrantless search of a
house, but excluded evidence seized from inside dresser drawers
and automobile tires. Because the Fourth Amendment claim had
been addressed by the trial court, McCurry could not file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.7 Instead, McCurry filed
3. Id.
4. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 2 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
5. Since this article focuses on Justice Blackmun’s opinions in the area of preclusion in the state-federal context, it does not deal with all the issues raised by
intersystem judicial preclusion. See generally Robert C. Casad, Symposium: Preclusion in a Federal System, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 599 (1985) (raising and discussing a
number of other preclusion issues in the state-federal context, e.g., preclusion in
diversity cases). Some commentators have denominated the broad problem area
as “intersystem preclusion.” See, e.g., MAURICE ROSENBERG, HANS SMIT &
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND
MATERIALS 1021 (5th ed. 1990); JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES
AND MATERIALS 1215, 1219 (5th ed. 1989); Robert C. Casad, Intersystem Issue
Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510
(1981). Others have utilized the term “interjurisdictional preclusion.” See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 625 (1985); RESTATEMENT SECOND,
supra note 4, at 3.
6. 449 U.S. 90, 105-16 (1980).
7. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that where the State provides
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search was introduced at trial).
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a complaint in federal court seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 from the officers who had seized the evidence from his
home. He further alleged a conspiracy to violate his Fourth
Amendment rights, an unconstitutional search and seizure, and an
assault on him after his arrest and handcuffing.
In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court concluded
that the normal rules of preclusion should apply in section 1983
suits, notwithstanding the unavailability of federal habeas corpus
relief. According to the majority, since McCurry had had one
chance to litigate fully the issue of unconstitutional conduct in the
pretrial suppression hearing in the state criminal trial, he should be
precluded from relitigating the issue in the federal section 1983 action.8 Noting that the federal appellate courts had generally upheld
the applicability of normal preclusion rules to section 1983 cases,
the majority concluded that neither the language of section 1983
nor its legislative history suggested that Congress intended to restrict the usual doctrines of preclusion or the normal scope of the
Full Faith and Credit Act, section 1738.9 The majority read section
1738 as “specifically requiring all federal courts to give preclusive
effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State
from which the judgments emerged would do so.”10
The majority recognized that Congress intended in section
1983 to change the balance of power between state and federal
courts, but believed that Congress simply intended for the federal
courts to operate where the “state courts were unable or unwilling
to protect federal rights.”11 Where there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the state courts, the normal rules of preclusion
should apply in subsequent federal court litigation. The absence of
opportunity for federal habeas review after Stone v. Powell12 “has
no bearing on section 1983 suits or on the question of the preclusive
effect of state-court judgments.”13
8. Technically, the Court decided only that the doctrine of issue preclusion
was applicable to McCurry’s federal § 1983 suit, but it did “not decide how the
body of collateral-estoppel doctrine or 28 U.S.C. § 1738 should apply in this case.”
449 U.S. at 105 n. 25.
9. Id. at 97-98. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) provides that “[J]udicial proceedings
[of a state court] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State. . . .”
10. 449 U.S. at 96.
11. Id. at 101; see generally id. at 99-101.
12. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980). Basically the majority believed
that Stone v. Powell involved only issues of federal habeas jurisdiction, and that
there was no reason to provide opportunity for federal relitigation after state crim-
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Justice Blackmun’s dissent focused on the legislative history of
section 1983, the federal policies fostered by the statute, and the
realities of a criminal defendant’s posture in the earlier state criminal litigation. These factors led Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, to conclude that the application of
issue preclusion here “works injustice on this § 1983 plaintiff, and it
makes more difficult the consistent protection of constitutional
rights, a consideration that was at the core of the enacters’ intent.”14 Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Allen demonstrates the key characteristics of his jurisprudence: a devotion to
individual rights, an appreciation of the effects of a decision on the
real people involved, and a sense of history.
Justice Blackmun provided a thorough and thoughtful analysis
of the legislative history of section 1983. Because section 1983 is
silent regarding the preclusive effects of prior state court judgments, the Court had previously given substantial weight to the
congressional intent.15 In rejecting the view of the majority that the
enacting Congress was concerned simply with assuring procedural
regularity, Justice Blackmun evaluated the legislative history and
concluded that “Congress consciously acted in the broadest possible
manner,”16 so as to ensure the substantive justice which might not
be obtained in the state courts when constitutional rights were at
stake.17 In enacting section 1983, Congress intended to provide
remedies for constitutional violations not effectively available in
state court. Therefore, it was “senseless to suppose that they would
have intended the federal courts to give full preclusive effect to
prior state adjudications.”18
Justice Blackmun also emphasized in his opinion how the preclusion issue in Allen fit within the existing section 1983 jurisprudence. In view of two critically important section 1983 opinions of
the Court, Monroe v. Pape19 and Mitchum v. Foster,20 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to restructure
federal and state relations, and to provide a remedy regardless of
inal cases simply because of the restrictions on criminal defendants’ choices. Id. at
103-04.
14. Id. at 106.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 109.
17. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 106-110 (1980).
18. Id. at 110.
19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
20. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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the circumstances of state law.21 The only prior precedent of the
Court addressing preclusion in section 1983 cases, England v. Medical Examiners,22 had permitted preclusion only where “‘a party
freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided
there . . . .’”23 Justice Blackmun believed that the majority’s approach in Allen wrongly abandoned these precedents.24
After reviewing the principles of preclusion, Justice Blackmun
criticized the majority’s emphasis on only one factor—the availability of a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in an earlier
case—as necessary to preclude subsequent federal litigation of a
section 1983 issue. Instead, Justice Blackmun believed that the doctrines of preclusion did not require such a narrow scope of limitations. In light of the policies behind section 1983, he believed that
all relevant factors should be considered in each case before applying preclusion.25 In Allen, a number of factors compelled refusing
preclusion. First, since nonmutual collateral estoppel was unknown
at the time of the enactment of section 1983, the enacting Congress
clearly would not have envisioned precluding a criminal defendant
from bringing a subsequent constitutional claim against the police.26
Second, the nature of the decisional process in a state criminal trial
differs substantially from that in a section 1983 action.27 Finally, a
state criminal defendant does not voluntarily choose to litigate the
issue of a Fourth Amendment violation in the state court. Since
realistically the state criminal defendant must raise all issues in the
criminal proceeding, he cannot be viewed as freely submitting his
21. 449 U.S. at 111.
22. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
23. 449 U.S. at 112 (quoting England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419
(1964)).
24. 449 U.S. at 112.
25. Id. at 113.
26. Id. at 114-15.
27. Id. at 115. Justice Blackmun noted a number of differences:
The remedy sought in [a § 1983 proceeding] is utterly different. In bringing the civil suit the criminal defendant does not seek to challenge his
conviction collaterally. At most, he wins damages. In contrast, the exclusion of evidence may prevent a criminal conviction. A trial court, faced
with the decision whether to exclude relevant evidence, confronts institutional pressures that may cause it to give a different shape to the Fourth
Amendment right from what would result in civil litigation of a damages
claim. Also, the issue whether to exclude evidence is subsidiary to the
purpose of a criminal trial, which is to determine the guilt or innocence of
the defendant, and a trial court, at least subconsciously, must weigh the
potential damage to the truth-seeking process caused by excluding relevant evidence.
Id.
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federal claims to the state court for decision.28 Hence, Justice
Blackmun concluded that it is “fundamentally unfair” to require
the state criminal defendant to make an unalterable choice between
having his claim heard in federal court or raising his defense in the
state criminal proceeding against him.29
Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Allen reflects three
fundamental themes of his jurisprudence. He clearly demonstrates
a commitment to individual rights by emphasizing the broad remedial purposes of section 1983 and the importance of an individual’s
ability to raise claims of constitutional violation in federal courts.
Moreover, his emphasis on individual rights also reflects a real appreciation for the individual rights of this specific litigant, and the
effects of this decision on the litigant. He appreciates that a criminal defendant in fact has no choice whether to raise a claim of a
Fourth Amendment violation in a state criminal proceeding; the
claim must be raised or the defendant will face a greater risk of
conviction. Those circumstances in reality mean that the criminal
defendant has not chosen to litigate the issue in state court, and
should not be considered to have made a voluntary choice to forego
a federal forum.30 Finally, Justice Blackmun is sensitive to the pur28. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 115 (1980).
29. Id. at 116. His emphasis on fairness for the individual involved is perhaps
all the more significant given his general position in fourth amendment cases. See
Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L.
REV. 183, 212, 235-39 (1988) (describing Justice Blackmun’s position in fourth
amendment cases). Moreover, Justice Blackmun had joined the majority in Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), holding that a state court criminal defendant could
not raise fourth amendment claims in a subsequent federal habeas case, unless he
had been denied any opportunity to litigate in state court.
30. Subsequently, the Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall in
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), concluded that where a criminal defendant
has pleaded guilty, and thus had not litigated the validity of a search and seizure,
he may file a later action in federal court under § 1983 raising fourth amendment
violations. Justice Marshall stated that “additional exceptions to collateral estoppel
may be warranted in § 1983 actions in light of the ‘understanding of § 1983’ that
‘the federal courts could step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to
protect federal rights.’ ” Id. at 313-14 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101
(1980)). In a footnote Justice Marshall also noted that the Court had “recognized
various other conditions that must also be satisfied before giving preclusive effect
to a state-court judgment.” 462 U.S. at 313 n. 7.
In Haring the Court first considered the relevant state law and concluded that
the state courts would not preclude the state criminal defendant who pleaded
guilty from subsequently litigating the validity of the search, and thus that § 1738
would not prevent the § 1983 action. 462 U.S. at 314-17. The Court also determined that it should not create a special federal rule of preclusion here because the
guilty plea did not constitute an admission or waiver of the fourth amendment
claim, and that a rule of preclusion here “would threaten important interests in
preserving federal courts as an available forum for the vindication of constitutional
rights,” id. at 322, and “would be wholly contrary to one of the central concerns
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poses of section 1983 as revealed by the legislative history and the
history of the era in which it was enacted.
III.

FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. V. MOITIE

Justice Blackmun wrote another opinion addressing preclusion
in the state-federal context in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie.31 In this case the Court held that a party who has failed to
appeal an initial adverse judgment by a federal court may not relitigate its claim in a subsequent action after other parties had successfully appealed the first judgment.32
In Moitie, Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in
which he expressed two significant reflections on preclusion doctrine. First, while agreeing with the result in the case, he criticized
the majority for failing to recognize that there may be some situations where preclusion doctrine should be tempered by “‘overriding
which motivated the enactment of § 1983, namely, the ‘grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights.’ ” Id. at
323 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99). Since there had not been any adjudication
at all of the issues regarding the search which might provide a basis for the § 1983
claim, the basic theory supporting preclusion, of conserving scarce judicial resources, was inapplicable. 462 U.S. at 322 n. 11.
31. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
32. In Moitie the plaintiffs brought six separate suits in the U.S. district court
seeking treble damages for federal antitrust violations. Moitie’s complaint referred
only to state law and was filed in the state court, but the case was removed to
federal court and joined with the others. The U.S. district court dismissed the actions for failure to allege an injury to the plaintiffs’ business property. Five plaintiffs appealed, but the plaintiffs in question (Brown and Moitie) instead filed two
new actions in state court purporting to raise only state law claims. Since the new
complaints made allegations similar to the initial complaints, the defendants removed the new cases to the U.S. district court and sought dismissal on the ground
of res judicata. Viewing the complaints as raising “essentially federal law” claims,
the district court dismissed, relying on the doctrine of res judicata. 452 U.S. at 396.
Meanwhile the court of appeals had reversed and remanded the appealed cases.
When faced with an appeal in the second Brown and Moitie cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of res judicata should be tempered by public policy and simple justice concerns, and permitted the nonappealing plaintiffs to
benefit from the successful appeal of the substantially identical parties. Moitie v.
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir.1980), rev’d, 452 U.S.
394 (1981). The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that there were no grounds for exception to the normal rules of preclusion,
and that there was “no general equitable doctrine” which would provide an exception to preclusion where another party with similar claims prevailed on appeal. 452
U.S. at 400. The plaintiffs had made “a calculated choice to forgo their appeals.”
Id. at 400-401. The Court refused to consider whether the first suit should be
viewed as preclusive of any possible purely state law claims involved in the second
suit, and simply held that the first suit was res judicata regarding the plaintiffs’
federal-law claims, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 402.
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concerns of public policy and simple justice.’”33 He provided examples, such as where there are unusual procedural complexities, or
where the rights of the various parties are inextricably intertwined,
as justification for a nonappealing party avoiding application of preclusion doctrine.34 Since those factors were not present in this case,
he concurred with the majority opinion barring relitigation of the
federal claims.
Second, in Moitie, Justice Blackmun addressed the relationship
between the federal and state claims. He believed that the state law
claims should be barred from relitigation, just as well as the federal
law claims.35 Under normal doctrines of claim preclusion, the first
decision precludes future litigation of all matters which might have
been raised in the first suit, whether or not those matters were actually raised, as long as they are related to the same claim which was
decided.36 In view of the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court,
the plaintiffs should have raised their state law claims in the first
action, and thus should be barred from litigating the second suit,
whether based on federal or state claims arising out of the
transaction.37
In Moitie, Justice Blackmun expressed his view that preclusion
doctrine should not be rigidly applied, and that on occasion fundamental justice concerns should overcome traditional principles of
preclusion. Moreover, he considered federalism implications of preclusion in the context of a federal court and its capacity to adjudicate state claims. Unlike the majority, he was willing to conclude
here that prior federal court resolution can have claim preclusion
effect regarding state law claims which could have been filed in federal court.38
33. 452 U.S. at 403 (quoting Moitie v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d
1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1980)).
34. 452 U.S. at 403.
35. Id. at 404. Justice Marshall joined the opinion.
36. Id. Justice Blackmun relied on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
Mar. 10, 1978). See also RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 2, at §§ 24-25; 18
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406 (1981).
37. Justice Brennan also agreed that the final judgment of the first case precluded relitigation of the same claim on a state law theory. 452 U.S. at 410-11.
However, he wrote a dissenting opinion concluding that the second suit was entirely based on state law, and should not have been removed to the federal court
because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds would be appropriate. Id. at 404-05.
38. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing implications of
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), for filings in
federal court of state law claims under federal court’s pendent jurisdiction).
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KREMER V. CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORP.

In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.39 the Court again
required a federal court to give preclusive effect to a prior state
court decision. Justice Blackmun once again wrote a strong dissenting opinion. Kremer involved a discrimination claim that a discharge and failure to rehire were based on the national origin and
religion of the former employee. Initially Kremer filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, which, pursuant to statute, referred
the claim to the relevant state agency.40 The state agency determined that there was no probable cause to believe that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory practices—a determination
which was upheld by the state agency’s appeal board as “not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.”41 The appeal board’s
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court. Kremer requested further action by the EEOC,
but a district director of the EEOC found that there was no reasonable cause to believe the charge of discrimination and issued a
right-to-sue notice.42 Kremer then filed a Title VII action in the
U.S. District Court. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
White, affirmed the lower courts’ conclusions that the federal complaint should be dismissed on grounds of preclusion.43
The majority in Kremer believed that there was no justification
for departing from the usual preclusion rules, or from the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Act.44 Since the decision of the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court would preclude any other action in the New York courts, the majority held
that section 1738 precluded any further action in federal court on
the same claim.45 Reading Allen v. McCurry to require an express
or implied partial repeal of section 1738 in subsequent legislation,
the majority concluded that neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history demonstrated a “clear and manifest”46 intent on
39. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
40. Id. at 463-64 (describing statutory framework, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
41. Id. at 464.
42. This is pursuant to the statutory framework, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5f(1) and
(3). See 456 U.S. at 465 n. 3.
43. 456 U.S. 461 at 485. The Court did not expressly decide whether it was
applying issue or claim preclusion, but stated that both doctrines would effectively
bar the subsequent federal suit. Id. at 481-82 n. 22.
44. See supra note 9.
45. 456 U.S. at 466-67.
46. Id. at 485.

320

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:311

the part of Congress in Title VII to depart from the preclusion requirements of section 1738.47
In his forceful dissent, Justice Blackmun focused on the structure of Title VII, the legislative history of the statute, the prior Supreme Court jurisprudence analyzing the statute and congressional
intent, the policies involved, and the effects of the Court’s decision
on real people who will be trapped by the decision.48 Again, Justice
Blackmun demonstrated an appreciation of history, both the history behind the statute and the precise legislative history, an earnest effort to protect individual rights, and an understanding of the
real effects of the decision upon the claimant.
Examining the structure of the statute, Justice Blackmun concluded that Congress clearly intended that a plaintiff could sue in
federal court despite a finding by a state agency of no discrimination.49 In 1972, Congress had amended Title VII to provide that the
EEOC should “accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced
47. Id. at 468-76. This approach of the majority has been criticized as an incorrect interpretation of § 1738. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward A General Approach, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 625, 639 (1985). Professor Burbank argues that Congress did not choose automatic application of the relevant state’s domestic preclusion laws when it enacted § 1738, and that “[s]tate preclusion rules that are hostile to or inconsistent
with federal substantive policies must yield to federal common law domestically,
and the statute makes the domestic solution binding nationally.” Id. at 639-40.
Thus, Professor Burbank would analyze these cases as raising problems of federal
common law. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor
Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 665 (1985). Professor Burbank develops his theory more fully in a subsequent article. Stephen B.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986). But see Gene R.
Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 1209, 1228
(1986) (stating that “[i]t is clear that, subject to constitutional restraints and the
possibility of a statutory exception, section 1738 requires federal courts to give
state judgments as much preclusive effect as they would have under state law.”
(Citations omitted)); David Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 326 (1978) (stating that § 1738 requires that law of state rendering judgment be applied in subsequent federal action).
48. 456 U.S. at 486. Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion,
which largely agreed with Justice Blackmun. Id. at 508.
49. Id. at 487. Subsequently, in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S.
788, 796 (1986), the Court concluded that “Congress did not intend unreviewed
state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims.” Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’ opinion dissenting from another aspect of
the Court’s opinion which required federal courts to give a state administrative
agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 action that the state courts would afford. Id. at 799.
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under State or local law.”50 This amendment demonstrated that
Congress intended to permit subsequent suits in federal court, and
did not intend to give preclusive effect to the earlier state proceedings.51 Since the statute did not differentiate between state agency
and state judicial review proceedings, all state findings were simply
entitled to substantial weight rather than preclusive effect.52 Moreover, the provision of a federal forum in section 706(c) of Title VII,
available despite termination of state proceedings, would be inconsistent with a rule of preclusion after state court affirmance of
agency action.53
Justice Blackmun evaluated the nature of the state court involvement in the review process as essentially the last step of administrative action, rather than a de novo review.54 In Justice
Blackmun’s view, preclusive effect was being given to the state
agency’s decision that there was not probable cause to believe that
discrimination had occurred. Since the standard of review for the
state court was whether the state agency’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the state court’s decision was
not a decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim but rather a
decision on the propriety of agency action. Thus, under fundamental principles of preclusion, since the issues in the state and federal
proceedings were different, preclusion could not apply.55 In sum,
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for doing one of two things:
either it is granting preclusive effect to the state agency’s decision, a course that it concedes would violate Title VII, or it is
misapplying § 1738 by giving preclusive effect to a state court decision that did not address the issue before the federal court. Instead of making one of these two mistakes, the Court should
accept the fact that the New York state court judicial review is
simply the end of the state administrative process, the state
“proceedings.”56

Justice Blackmun also painstakingly examined the legislative
history of Title VII and concluded that this legislative history
clearly established that Congress intended to afford a federal remedy and did not intend to make state administrative remedies exclu50.
5(b)).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

456 U.S. at 488 (quoting Title VII, § 706(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e456 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 493.
456 U.S. at 494.
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sive.57 The legislative history revealed concern about the nature of
state agency proceedings and demonstrated the desire to provide
vigorous enforcement of civil rights.58
Justice Blackmun based his conclusion in part on prior Supreme Court decisions which indicated that Congress did not intend
that prior proceedings would automatically preclude a subsequent
Title VII suit.59 While not precluding a subsequent federal suit after an unsuccessful state agency action, the Court’s majority would
have precluded a subsequent federal suit after a state court upheld
such agency action as not arbitrary or capricious. This restriction by
the majority disregarded what the Court had previously found to be
a framework of “overlapping, independent, supplementary discrimination remedies.”60
Finally Justice Blackmun described the real effects of the
Court’s decision. In view of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
argued, a prudent complainant should avoid state court review of
state agency action. If the complainant seeks state court review and
loses, he will be precluded from a successful suit in federal court.
But if the complainant foregoes state court review, he can go to the
EEOC and then to federal court, where he will receive a de novo
trial with the benefits of federal procedure. This elimination of the
57. Id. at 496-97. Justice Blackmun noted that Congress did provide that the
EEOC could enter into worksharing agreements with state agencies, which could
provide that complainants could be remitted exclusively to remedies before the
state agencies. Id.
58. Id. at 498-501.
59. Four key cases which Justice Blackmun discussed are McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff can sue in federal court based on
Title VII claim, despite prior EEOC determination of no reasonable cause); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (plaintiff can sue in federal court
despite prior adverse arbitration under collective bargaining agreement); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 provide separate and distinct remedies for discrimination); and Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (plaintiff can bring Title VII suit despite prior
Civil Service Commission affirmance of federal agency’s rejection of discrimination claim).
60. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 502 (1982). Justice
Blackmun cited the language of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
47-48 (1974) (emphasis added by Justice Blackmun):
[L]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to
accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination. . . . Title
VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums. . . . And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum
does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative
history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.
456 U.S. at 502-03.
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review by state courts will have the ironic effect of weakening the
quality of state agency decisionmaking, as well as diminishing the
importance of state courts.61 Moreover, for complainants who are
unaware of the majority’s rule, the decision to seek state court review will bar the federal forum. Justice Blackmun eloquently described their plight:
[T]he Court, for a small class of discrimination complainants, has
undermined the remedial purpose of Title VII. Invariably, there
will be some complainants who will not be aware of today’s decision. The Court has thus constructed a rule that will serve as a
trap for the unwary pro se or poorly represented complainant.
For these complainants, their sole remedy lies in the state administrative processes . . . the nature of the agency’s deliberations
combined with deferential judicial review can lead only to discrimination charges receiving less careful consideration than
Congress intended when it passed Title VII. The Court’s decision thus cannot be squared with the congressional intent that the
fight against discrimination be a policy “of the highest priority.”62

Given the nature of administrative decisionmaking in the area of
discrimination, previously recognized by the Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,63 and the deferential nature of state court review,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court’s decision would restrict
the availability of Title VII relief. Such a restriction is unwarranted;
the text, legislative history, and policies embodied in the statute
“demonstrate that Congress contemplated relitigation of a discrimination claim in federal court, even though a state court had refused
to disturb a state agency decision adverse to the complainant.”64
61. Id. at 504-05. Justice Blackmun described this as “a perverse sort of comity that eliminates the reviewing function of state courts in the name of giving their
decisions due respect.” Id. at 505. Moreover, he states that “[i]n this case, the
Court has chosen preclusion over common sense, with the result that the state
courts will decline, not grow, in importance.” Id. at 506.
62. Id. at 506-07. Cf. Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun,
96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 731-32 (1983). The note cites Kremer in support of the
proposition that “Justice Blackmun has repeatedly depicted in recent years a vision
of aggrieved individuals threatened with losing their way in a legal maze. Such a
perception has helped to generate doctrinal positions that seek to preserve the
availability of legal resources and the judicial machinery.” Id. at 731.
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This case was described by Justice Blackmun in
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 502.
64. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 508 (1982). Justice
Blackmun carefully distinguished the situation involved in Kremer from a case
where a state court had held a trial on the merits; in the latter case preclusion
would apply. Id. Moreover, he noted that even a state court’s affirmance of a state
agency’s decision could be admitted into evidence and accorded substantial (but
not preclusive) weight. Id.
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Justice Blackmun’s approach in Kremer thus combined the
three focal points of his analysis: a thorough grounding in the legislative history and policy of the statute (Title VII); an evaluation of
the implications for effectuation of individual rights; and a recognition and description of the real effects of the decision on individuals. He concluded that preclusion is wrong here: not only did
Congress intend to afford a federal remedy, but that remedy is important in effectuating full consideration of Title VII claims and in
avoiding procedural traps for unwary or poorly advised litigants.
V.

MIGRA V. WARREN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
EDUCATION

OF

In 1984 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the unanimous
Court in Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education.65
In Migra, the Court held that a plaintiff who lost a state court action
raising state law claims may be barred under claim preclusion doctrines from bringing a subsequent suit in federal court which raises
claims pertaining to the same transaction. This decision may seem
to conflict with Justice Blackmun’s previous dissents discussed
above, but is in fact consistent with his prior views and continues to
reflect the themes emphasized in this article.
Migra, whose employment was not renewed by the school
board, brought suit in state court, claiming breach of contract by
the school board and wrongful interference with her contract by the
individual members of the board. The state court did not decide
issues of conspiracy or individual member liability, but ruled that
there was a binding contract which entitled Migra to reinstatement
and compensatory damages. Migra successfully sought the state
trial court to dismiss without prejudice the conspiracy and individual member liability issues.66 Migra then filed suit in the U.S. district court against the school board, its individual members, and the
superintendent of schools. She argued that her contract was not renewed because she had exercised her First Amendment rights, that
she had been deprived of property without due process, and that
she had been denied equal protection. Invoking 42 U.S.C. sections
1983 and 1985, Migra sought injunctive relief, and compensatory
Subsequently, Justice Blackmun reiterated his view that Kremer impermissibly
restricts effectuation of the congressional purpose of Title VII, and will result in
avoidance of state courts by well-advised plaintiffs. Consolidated Foods Corp. v.
Unger, 456 U.S. 1002, 1003-04 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in remand for reconsideration in light of Kremer, but restating his objections to Kremer).
65. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
66. The trial judge’s decision was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, and
review was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at 79.
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and punitive damages. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of preclusion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.67
The issue for the Court in Migra was whether claim preclusion
should apply to bar a subsequent federal section 1983 suit after
state court litigation of related state law claims—an issue expressly
left unresolved in Allen v. McCurry.68 Despite the potential awkwardness involved in his prior role as chief dissenter in Allen, Justice Blackmun accurately reflected both the majority and dissenting
views in Allen, placed Migra in context, and applied precedent in
conjunction with his own analytical framework.
Justice Blackmun began with the principles established by the
majorities in Allen and Kremer that the Full Faith and Credit Act,
section 1738, requires that a subsequent federal court give the same
preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment that the state court
would give to its own prior judgment.69 In Allen this general rule
was applied to require issue preclusion in a subsequent federal section 1983 suit. The majority in Allen did not believe that either the
language or the legislative history of section 1983 demonstrated an
intent to depart from the normal rules of preclusion. In light of
Allen, Justice Blackmun wrote in Migra: “[i]t is difficult to see how
the policy concerns underlying section 1983 would justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and claim preclusive effects of
state-court judgments.”70 Since issue preclusion and claim preclusion implicate similar concerns in section 1983 litigation, Justice
Blackmun concluded that the decision in Allen logically permitted
the application of claim preclusion in subsequent section 1983 cases
in federal court.71
67. Id. at 80.
68. 449 U.S. at 97 n. 10.
69. 465 U.S. at 81. As discussed above, these are decisions with which Justice
Blackmun fundamentally disagreed. However, Justice Blackmun in Migra wrote
the opinion for the Court, in light of the existing precedents of Allen and Kremer.
Professor Robert Smith raises the question whether Migra “could be read to go
even further [than Allen and Kremer] in its apparent reliance on a literal interpretation of section 1738.” Robert H. Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A
Reappraisal, 63 N. C. L. REV. 59, 79 (1984). He then explains that there was no
occasion for the Court in Migra to develop exceptions to the application of state
law in determining claim preclusion, id. at 79-81, and he argues that Migra and the
other precedents permit flexibility in developing exceptions that will allow the
courts to accommodate § 1983 policies in individual cases. Id. at 106-123.
70. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984).
71. Id. at 84. In light of the resolution by the Court of the earlier cases, the
real question remaining in Migra was simply whether there is a basis for treating
claim preclusion differently from issue preclusion in § 1983 cases, or whether there
were any other factors which would justify a different approach in Migra. Criticism
of Migra for failing to appreciate the legislative history of § 1983 misses the
mark—that issue was resolved adversely by the majority in Allen. Cf. Leanne B.
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Justice Blackmun also considered Migra’s argument that to
deny claim preclusive effect would be advantageous in permitting
litigants to bring state claims in state court and federal claims in
federal court. He determined that the Full Faith and Credit Act
emphasized respect for state court judgments, and was not designed
simply to provide alternative fora for state and federal claims. He
stated, “[t]his reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of
comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.”72
Finally, he pointed out that Migra had the initial free choice of
whether to sue in state or federal court, and that a state court could
have adjudicated her federal claims. Alternatively, unlike McCurry
who had been a criminal defendant in the state court in Allen,73
Migra could have proceeded first in federal court. Under these circumstances, Justice Blackmun concluded that it is appropriate to
allow claim preclusion to apply in the subsequent federal court section 1983 action. The Court held that the “state-court judgment in
this litigation has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court
that the judgment would have in the Ohio state courts.”74
De Vos, Comment, Claim Preclusion and Section 1983 Civil Rights Actions: Migra
v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 70 IOWA L. REV. 287, 295-300
(1984). Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun’s conviction expressed in his earlier dissenting opinions that the majority was wrong in Allen, his approach in Migra reflects respect for the principle of stare decisis and for precedent. But cf. supra note
64.
72. 465 U.S. at 84. Again this emphasis on the application of § 1738 reflects
the weight of the Court’s prior majority opinions in Allen and Kremer.
73. It is primarily at this point that Justice Blackmun noted his prior opinion
dissenting in Allen. He described his opinion there as heavily influenced by the
posture of the § 1983 plaintiff in the prior state litigation as a criminal defendant,
and distinguished Migra as one who was in control in determining where she
wished to file suit initially. He also pointed out that if suit is initially filed in federal court, and the federal court abstains from ruling on federal claims pending
state court resolution of state claims, a plaintiff can preserve her right to federal
court resolution of the federal claims, citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 465 U.S. at 85 n. 7. In England the Court
distinguished the situation where a party voluntarily submits her entire case, including federal claims, to the state court. 375 U.S. at 418-19.
74. The case was remanded for a determination whether the Ohio courts
would apply claim preclusion in this context, since the federal courts should apply
“Ohio state preclusion law.” 465 U.S. at 87. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion indicating that if he were deciding the matter anew, he would permit a federal
court to give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state court
would. Id. at 88. Justice White later joined a majority opinion holding that state
preclusion principles should be considered in determining the preclusive effect of a
prior state court judgment on a subsequent federal antitrust suit, and rejecting the
notion that the federal courts should give greater preclusive effect than a state
court would to its own prior judgment. Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (Opinion of the Court by Justice
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Thus in Migra, Justice Blackmun demonstrated his ability to
resolve new cases in light of existing precedent, even that with
which he strongly disagreed. Justice Blackmun believed that the
majority’s decision in Allen was wrong because it fundamentally
misconstrued the nature of section 1983, congressional intent, and
the effects on real people and on individual rights. However, in
light of the majority in Allen, he acknowledged the logical implications of that decision in the related area of claim preclusion. He
analyzed the posture of the plaintiff, and the real choices that she
had, which were totally different from those of the criminal defendant in Allen. The civil plaintiff in Migra, unlike the criminal defendant in Allen or even the Title VII claimant in Kremer, had an
unfettered initial choice whether to sue in state court or in federal
court, and both fora could resolve all of her related claims. Thus,
Justice Blackmun concluded that, in light of precedent and the posture of the parties, application of claim preclusion was warranted.
This decision in Migra may result in more section 1983 litigation filed in federal court. After Migra, parties must go to federal
court first if they seek a federal forum, rather than going to state
court first on their state claims and waiting until later to obtain, if
necessary, resolution of federal claims in federal court. In order to
prevent claim preclusion of state law claims, those state law claims
must be raised in federal court under pendent jurisdiction.75 However, these are simply the results of the federal structure, and of the
Court’s decision in Allen that the legislative history of section 1983
does not provide an exception to the mandate of preclusion found
O’Connor; Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of
the case).
In Marrese the Court held that normally under § 1738 state preclusion law
should first be considered to determine whether the state courts would apply preclusion principles, even where the subsequent federal antitrust claim could only be
heard in federal court. Id. at 379–86. Only if the state courts would apply preclusion would the federal court need to determine whether an exception to § 1738
should exist to prevent claim preclusion in subsequent cases within the exclusive
federal court jurisdiction for antitrust cases. Id. at 386. The Court also stated:
“[w]e therefore reject a judicially created exception to § 1738 that effectively holds
as a matter of federal law that a plaintiff can bring state law claims initially in state
court only at the cost of forgoing subsequent federal antitrust claims.” Id. Since
usually courts do not apply preclusion to matters that for jurisdictional reasons
could not have been raised in an initial suit, it is likely that in most states there
would not be claim preclusion in these circumstances. See id. at 382; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 4, at § 26(1)(c).
75. See generally 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3567.1 (1984). Certain pendent claims may not be able to be raised
in federal court. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (Eleventh Amendment prevents federal court injunction of state officers to
enforce state claims).

328

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:311

in section 1738.76 Moreover, the result of Migra of encouraging
plaintiffs with section 1983 actions to file first in federal court is
consistent with Justice Blackmun’s overall views of the importance
of section 1983 in providing a federal forum.77
It is interesting to compare Justice Blackmun’s decision applying claim preclusion in Migra with an earlier decision which he
wrote for the Court refusing to apply claim preclusion in a statefederal context. In Brown v. Felsen,78 Justice Blackmun concluded
in a unanimous opinion for the Court that a federal bankruptcy
court could consider extrinsic evidence in adjudicating whether a
debt, which was previously reduced to judgment in a state court
proceeding, was dischargeable under section 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act.79 The Court believed in this case “that neither the interests
served by res judicata, the process of orderly adjudication in state
courts, nor the policies of the Bankruptcy Act would be well served
by foreclosing petitioner from submitting additional evidence to
prove his case.”80
Several factors were critical to the Court’s decision in Brown to
permit a guarantor, who had obtained a prior state court judgment
against a debtor, to raise in the subsequent federal bankruptcy
court proceeding issues of fraud and deceit of the debtor in obtaining the guarantee. First, the guarantor was not attempting to
challenge the validity of the prior state court judgment, but rather
to respond to the initiative taken by the debtor to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy.81 Second, the issues in the bankruptcy litigation were different from issues involved in the state litigation, and it
was unlikely that litigants would raise issues which might arise only
if a bankruptcy were filed.82 Third, Congress intended to provide a
federal forum of the federal bankruptcy court to resolve these section 17 issues. Although Congress had not spoken expressly on the
76. Cf. De Vos, supra note 71, at 310 (criticizing Migra, for, inter alia, producing more federal court litigation).
77. In addition to the cases in which Justice Blackmun has expressed an expansive view of § 1983, many of which are discussed supra, an article written by
Justice Blackmun also demonstrates his view of the importance of § 1983 in assuring the “commitment of our society to be governed by law and to protect the rights
of those without power against oppression at the hands of the powerful.” Harry A.
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985).
78. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 35, Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–467, 84 Stat. 990
(repealed 1978).
80. 442 U.S. at 132.
81. Id. at 133.
82. Id. at 135.
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issue, “it would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970
amendments to adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these section 17 questions away from the [federal] bankruptcy courts and
forces them back into state courts.”83 Finally, although the failure
to litigate fraud and deceit in state court might preclude claims in
state court for extraordinary remedies such as exemplary damages,
the failure to litigate such issues should not prevent recovery on the
debt when a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is filed by the
debtor in federal court.84 Thus the Court determined that the prior
state court judgment adjudicating the existence of a debt did not
preclude the guarantor from raising issues of the debtor’s fraud in a
subsequent federal bankruptcy proceeding brought by the debtor.
Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Brown did not refer to section
1738.85 It focused instead on the purposes of the federal bankruptcy
statute. The decision is premised on the concept, developed later in
Justice Blackmun’s and other Justices’ opinions, that a subsequent
statutory enactment, such as the bankruptcy statute here, may explicitly or implicitly provide exceptions to section 1738. Alternatively, the decision may be premised on a theory that federal law
guides preclusion decisions in federal court and that such federal
law may be an amalgam of federal statutory and federal common
law. Brown, of course, preceded Allen by a year, and it was Allen
which established the majority view that section 1738 generally requires application of state preclusion law—a view which was then
applied to the question of claim preclusion in Migra.
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Brown demonstrated many of the same traits observed above in his preclusion
opinions involving section 1983 actions. Recognizing the purposes
of preclusion doctrine,86 he evaluated the application of the doctrine in the particularly significant federalism context where the initial litigation occurs in state court and is followed by litigation in
federal court on federal issues. He addressed relevant federal legislation and its legislative history to determine whether there are ex83. 442 U.S. at 136. See also id. at 138 (summarizing legislative history demonstrating congressional intent to have bankruptcy court resolve these issues).
84. Id. at 137-38. The Court explicitly limited the decision to claim preclusion.
If the state litigation had actually determined fraud, a different question, that of
issue preclusion, would be implicated. The Court did not decide the question of
issue preclusion. Id. at 139 n. 10.
85. The parties made no mention of § 1738 in their briefs to the Court. See
Brief for the Petitioner, Brief for the Respondent, and Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (No. 78-58).
86. “Res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.” 442 U.S. at 131.
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press or implied federal interests which warrant exception from the
normal doctrines of preclusion. Moreover, he considered the plight
of the actual litigants, and the real effects that alternative preclusion holdings would have on their conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
The application of preclusion doctrine in the state-federal context might be considered to be a dry and difficult area, fraught with
extraordinarily technical issues. In recent years, however, this has
proved to be an area of intersection and conflict between important
policies expressed in federal statutes, such as section 1983 and Title
VII, and principles motivating preclusion, whether expressed in
common law doctrines of preclusion or in the interpretation of section 1738. In the three key cases, Allen, Kremer, and Migra, Justice
Blackmun developed his analysis of whether preclusion was proper,
demonstrating his commitment to the three central themes of his
jurisprudence. Justice Blackmun explained his analysis of the legislative history of the relevant statutes, his sense of the history of the
era in which each statute was enacted, and his understanding of the
importance of the resolution of the preclusion problem in a fashion
consistent with the policies motivating the statute. His appreciation
of history is apparent. These cases also reflect the importance of
individual rights in Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence; he is concerned that litigants have a fair and adequate opportunity to litigate
their constitutional rights. Finally, these cases demonstrate Justice
Blackmun’s attention to actual outcomes. He is concerned with
what will happen to real individuals as a result of the decision.
Justice Blackmun’s positions in Migra, Allen, and Kremer also
reflect the importance of party choice. In Allen, the state criminal
defendant had no real choice whether to litigate in state court, and
application of preclusion doctrine constituted a particularly great
infringement of his rights afforded by section 1983 to litigate in a
federal court. In contrast, in Migra, the plaintiff in federal court had
been the plaintiff in state court, had exercised the initial choice of
forum, and could have raised both state and federal law claims initially in a single federal court action. In such a situation it is appropriate to accommodate the tension between policies of affording a
federal forum for section 1983 cases and principles of preclusion
expressed through section 1738. The initial party choice of a state
court forum may result in subsequent exclusion from the federal
courts on a claim involved in the same transaction. The results
reached by Justice Blackmun in these three key cases illustrate his
approach to jurisprudence. They are also eminently sensible and re-
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flect both a sensitivity to individual rights and an awareness of the
impact on litigants.

***

